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‘Says Who?’ Liquid Authority and Interpretive Control in Transnational Regulatory Regimes 
Julia Black1 
 
Abstract  
The article explores the notion of liquid authority by examining the ways in which the central 
organisations in three transnational regulatory governance regimes do or do not attempt to  
establish interpretive control over the norms that they issue: the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), the International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO), and the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC). The need to ‘solidify’ their authority ranges across their regulatory functions; this 
article focuses on just one of those functions: interpretation. In focusing on how these regulators 
seek to exercise interpretive control, the article seeks to show how liquid authority can crystallise.  
Further, the article develops the notion of liquid authority by arguing that the establishment, 
exercise and continual maintenance of authority in transnational regulatory regimes, which are 
characterised by liquid authority as they lack a formal, legal base, are fundamentally linked to the 
issue of legitimacy.  It argues in turn that legitimacy, and thus authority, is endogenously produced, a 
fact which exogenous, normative assessments of legitimacy can overlook.  The article argues that 
regulators play an active role in their own legitimation – in creating, exercising and maintaining their 
legitimacy, and in turn their authority, and that their success or otherwise in doing so is linked in 
part to their functional effectiveness, but that transnational regulators face a legitimacy paradox: 
they depend in part on such effectiveness for their legitimacy. The article supplements the 
‘anatomical’ analysis of  liquid authority with  an understanding of the physiology of legitimation.   
Key words: transnational regulation; authority; legitimacy; rule interpretation; transnational 
standard setters 
 
Introduction 
The dynamics of transnational regulatory regimes are only just now starting to be understood, 
though concerns about their accountability and legitimacy have been expressed for some time.  
Puzzlement is also expressed as to how such regimes are sustained, and from where they derive 
their authority: why do certain actors treat their norms as independent reasons for action in the 
absence of any legal requirement to do so?  As Nico Krisch argues in the introduction to this special 
issue, traditional, ‘solid’ notions of authority that attach to the nation state or formally constituted 
international organisations are challenged when confronted with the realities of transnational, non-
state regulatory systems, requiring a more ‘liquid’ conceptualisation of authority and understanding 
of it sources and modes of operation (Krisch, this volume).  
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arrangements in place in the regulatory organisations discussed are as they were in December 2015, 
2 
 
This article explores the anatomy of liquid authority in transnational regimes by focusing on a core 
function in any regulatory regime, viz how interpretive control over the norms (rules, standards, 
principles) that are written is established and exercised.  It further analyses how that particular 
exercise of liquid authority is linked to the need for the regime to constantly re-establish and renew 
its authority in the absence of a formal legal framework, and how that authority is fundamentally 
linked to strategies of legitimation (the gaining, developing, enhancing or repairing legitimacy).    
In the concept of liquid authority, the core conception of authority, as seminally articulated by Raz, 
as non-coercive, content-independent reasons for action, is retained (Raz 1979).  The differentiation 
of liquid authority from formal legal authority lies in the different sources of authority, which are not 
grounded in law but in social relations.  In  finding the source of authority in  social relations and a 
voluntary acceptance of deference, the analysis of liquid authority draws attention to the necessarily 
fluid, dynamic and ultimately contested bases on which authority is founded when detached from 
the stabilising structures of the state, hence the metaphor of liquidity to describe it.  As is well 
recognised in the literature, authority in the transnational context is informal, based on social and 
political acceptance not formal legal rules; it is ideational, based on ideas of what is the appropriate 
thing to do (though often articulated in technocratic terms and based on epistemic claims to expert 
knowledge); it is necessarily exercised through non-legal or ‘soft’ law norms and ‘enforced’ through 
social or community practices.  Whilst authority can be based on a cognitive acceptance that a 
particular actor or group of actors are those who are most appropriate to govern, very often it is 
contested (Krisch, this volume, for review).    
Authority which is not founded in law cannot be exercised through legal rules, unsurprisingly, and so 
attention in the literature then frequently turns to the relative functional efficacy of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
law, particularly with respect to their enforceability, or to whether non-legal regulatory regimes are 
‘legitimate’ in accordance with an exogenously produced normative criteria.  This article also focuses 
on the functioning of ‘soft’ law regimes, but on a relatively under-explored aspect of those regimes, 
viz. whether and how they seek to maintain interpretive  control over the norms they issue. As such 
it is focused on a particular form of the exercise of ‘liquid’ authority in the performance of one 
particular regulatory function, that of interpretation.   
Moreover, the article  develops the notion of liquid authority by arguing that the establishment, 
exercise and continual maintenance of authority in transnational regulatory regimes are 
fundamentally linked to the issue of legitimacy.  It argues that legitimacy, and thus authority, is 
endogenously produced, a fact which exogenous, normative assessments of legitimacy can overlook.  
Furthermore, it argues that regulators play an active role in their own legitimation – in creating, 
exercising and maintaining their legitimacy, and in turn their authority, and that their success or 
otherwise in doing so is linked in part to their functional effectiveness.  As such, the article argues 
that the anatomy of liquid authority can usefully be supplemented by an understanding of the 
physiology of legitimation.   
The article is divided into three sections.  The first section sets out the context, explaining the links 
between authority and legitimacy in the transnational context.  It then focuses on the exercise of a 
particular regulatory function, establishing a common interpretation of the rules that the regime or a 
particular actor within it issues, which is paralleled in state-based regulatory regimes.  In a sense, 
what those who operate on the basis of liquid authority are trying to do in establishing interpretive 
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control, is to ‘solidify’ their authority – reduce the endless fluidity by making concrete the 
interperetation and application of their rules.  Exercising interpretive control is thus an instantiation 
of the exercise of authority in one important functional area of operation.  Moreover, it is an 
exercise of authority that state-based regulators take for granted as their authority to exercise 
interpretive control is set out in their legal mandates, or it is vested in courts.  For transnational 
regulators operating in the context of liquid authority, there may be a set of documents constituting 
the authority, but they are not necessarily based in law.   So transnational regulators have to work to 
build their authority, and hence their ability to exercise interpretive control.   Two things are of 
interest here: the extent to which transnational regulators do in fact seek to exercise interpretive 
control over the written norms (principles, rules, standards and so forth) they issue, and how they 
build their authority to enable them to do so.   Drawing on literature on legitimacy in the 
transnational regulatory context and on theories of rules and interpretation, the analysis of the 
three regimes considered here  suggests that the extent to which a rule-issuer may seek to exercise 
interpretive control over its own rules in the absence of a formal legal basis for authority  is based on 
two inter-related functional needs: to maintain the  operation of the regulatory regime, and to build 
and maintain its legitimacy and thus its authority with respect to those legitimacy communities it 
views as most important to the regime’s survival.   
As Nico Krisch makes clear, liquid authority is a relative notion, and there is a spectrum of solidity-
liquidity.  Some transnational regimes may exhibit more liquidity than others, as institutional 
structures stabilise and authority crystallises and solidifies.  The second section explores this 
dynamic by examining the ways in which actors in three transnational regulatory regimes do or do 
not attempt to exercise interpretive authority and control over the norms that they issue, and how 
these practices change over time: the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the 
International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO), and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).     
The third section analyses some of the possible reasons for the manner in which each regime has 
sought to perform the particular function of maintaining interpretive control through the exercise of 
interpretive authority, and what this contributes to an understanding of the nature of authority and 
legitimacy in transnational regulatory regimes. The article develops the notion of liquid authority by 
arguing that how ‘liquid’ authority functions in the transnational context is fundamentally linked to 
the need, in the absence of state-based legal authority, to constantly create authority through 
establishing the legitimacy of the actor purporting to exercise that authority.  In addition, it argues 
that  functionality, legitimation and authority are fundamentally intertwined.  Finally it  reveals the 
ultimate vulnerability of actors who rely on direct social acceptance rather than the mediating 
institutions of state constitutions for their right to govern. 
Setting the context 
This article adopts a regulatory functionalist approach, focusing on  how regulators exercise their 
functions, and argues that their ability and capacity to function is rooted in practice in legitimation.  
Legitimation is the process by which regulatory actors gain the authority to perform their functions.  
Regulatory functions comprise four main tasks: agenda setting and goal determination, the creation 
of (written or unwritten) norms or rules, monitoring, and changing behaviour to align with the norm.  
In state-based, non-stated based and hybrid regimes these tasks are often dispersed amongst a 
number of different actors in a decentred or polycentric set of relationships which may be managed 
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or orchestrated in various ways (Black 2001; Black 2002; Abbott and Snidal 2010).  Moreover, within 
any issue area there may be several regulatory regimes, systems or networks, both state and non-
state, public and private, which can interact in different ways. Alternatively there may be multiple 
regulators in a particular domain, again both state and non-state, who may compete, cooperate or 
simply ignore one another (Eberlein et al 2014).   In such situations, regulators have to compete for 
‘regulatory share’ using a range of strategies, including legitimation (Black 2009).    
This article focuses on one core element of any regulatory regime: written norms.  In all types of 
regulatory systems, written norms (rules, standards, principles and so forth) are a core regulatory 
technology.   Written norms are expressions of an understanding or set of understandings of the 
social / physical environment which can also be constitutive of that environment and which can be 
used to alter or otherwise affect it, but whose very formulation, in linguistic structure, legal status or 
substantive content, can affect the performance of those norms in different ways (Schauer 1991, 
Black 1997, Braithwaite 2002).   
Polycentric regimes and rule complexes 
Polycentric regulatory governance regimes or systems, both state, non-state and hybrid, are 
frequently characterised by dense rule-complexes.  In the transnational context, rules may emanate 
principally from a focal (but not necessarily legal) source and cascade through the regulatory regime 
via national and regional legal systems, in which public and private norms may intermingle and 
interact (Black 2002, Bartley 2011).  As with legal rules, transnational rules may be accompanied by 
quasi-legal or non-legal guidance from state and non-state regulators, and a host of local 
interpretations and codes such as those of certification bodies or the compliance manuals of 
individual firms (themselves often written by third parties such as management consultants and 
legal advisors).     
At each point of transposition, as rules emanating from one source are transposed into other norms 
and implemented and enforced in numerous fora, the rule may be changed, altered in its text and / 
or meaning, and indeed the number of points of transposition may have been so great or so 
dispersed in time and / or space that those transposing, using and interpreting it may not be aware 
of its original source.  The HACCP (hazard and critical control point) principles of the Codex 
Alimentarius, for example, are transposed into EU directives, member state laws, regulatory 
guidance and food retailers’ compliance manuals, and implemented and enforced through the 
medium of market–based mechanism such as supply chain contracts and / or state-based 
institutions such as regulatory agencies and courts.   
Rules may also be networked through cross-referencing, which can create (or express) inter-
dependencies and can be potentially reinforcing through conditionality:  ‘if you comply with X rule 
from Y organisation, then you comply with our requirements or get Z benefit within our part of the 
regime’.   As rules cascade through a regulatory regime, as rule complexes or ‘ensembles’ are built 
(Perez 2011), the life of rules becomes one of multiple conversations, interpretations, transpositions, 
and applications.  Regulatory-governance regimes of all types are thus characterised by multiple 
regulatory conversations (Black, 1997, 1998) occurring simultaneously and over time and across 
multiple locations and between all involved in interpreting and applying norms, including third party 
advisors.  Through this dense network of conversations such regimes are constituted and continually 
reproduced.    
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Those who write the rules can attempt to control the interpretations that those rules are given in 
their application, and thus set the boundaries of such conversations, through rule design.   Variations 
in rule design comes from the differential use of the dimensions of rules, notably their linguistic 
structure (if they use precise or general terms, if they are simple or complex), their character (if they 
are permissive or mandatory in nature), and their clarity  (the extent to which they use language 
which is commonly understood in the rule community (Diver 1983, Baldwin 1991, Black 1997).   
However, as we know, a rule writer can never completely control the interpretation and application 
of rules due to the inherent imprecision of language, the inevitable lack of foresight of rule-writers, 
and the multiple sites in which rules are interpreted and applied. 
Rule-based systems therefore often have individuals or organisations whose role it is to interpret the 
rules in cases of doubt or contestation in order to stabilise interpretations, either generally or in 
particular instances.   It should be noted, however, that interpretation is distinct from dispute 
resolution and indeed from enforcement – the question being asked here is not: ‘who can impose 
(market, social, legal) sanctions on another?’  or ‘how should we resolve this dispute?’  It is instead, 
‘how, if at all, are interpretations stabilised through the exercise of interpretive control, and / or 
interpretive authority within the regulatory regime?’ In a state-based context the answer is usually 
provided in the legal mandate of the regulator and the wider constitutional settlement: a regulatory 
agency may be given the power to enforce its own norms, or this may be given to another state-
based body such as a court or tribunal, or there is some other legally mandated arrangement which 
may or may not involve non-public bodies.  In the context of a transnational regulatory regime 
where there is no ‘solid’ basis for the exercise of interpretive control, the fundamental question is 
‘on the basis of what authority does this organisation exercise this function?’.  In the case of the 
function of interpretation, when exercised in the context of liquid authority, the challenge for the 
regulator is to answer the question; ‘says who?’  The exercise of interpretive authority and control in 
transnational regulatory regimes is a little explored aspect of their operations.  However, exploring 
how regulators build the authority to exercise interpretive control in a context when authority is 
founded in social relations which are not formalised in a legal, constitutional settlement, provides an 
excellent window on the question of how regulatory regimes founded on ‘liquid’ authority seek to 
stabilise their institutional positions, and illustrates in turn how the exercise of their authority, 
including their interpretive authority, is dependent on legitimation.        
Authority and legitimacy in transnational polycentric regimes 
As Nico Krisch explains in the introduction, authority in the transnational context still infers that the 
utterances of an organisation or group provide independent reasons for action for a group of other 
actors.  However, very broadly, once the authority of an actor is not based in law but in some other 
reason for social acceptance, that authority becomes increasingly ‘liquid’ and potentially contested.  
As such, the sources of liquid authority resonate strongly with sociological understandings of 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy in a regulatory and governance context means that the actor has social 
credibility and acceptability such that it is perceived as having a right to govern both by those it 
seeks to govern and those on behalf it purports to govern (Suchman 1995; Scott 2001; Weber 
1948,213; Beetham 1991).  In sociological versions of institutional theory, there are three sets of 
reasons for social acceptance, or legitimacy.  Legitimacy may be pragmatically based:  the person or 
social group perceives that the organisation will pursue their interests directly or indirectly.  It can be 
morally or normatively based:  the person or social group perceives the goals and / or procedures of 
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the organisation to be normatively appropriate).  Finally, legitimacy can be cognitively based: the 
organisation is accepted as necessary or inevitable (Suchman 1995; Zucker 1987).  Sociological 
writings on transnational regulation have described regimes as ‘legitimate’ where legitimacy is based 
on self-interested acceptance, at least in the early phases of a transnational regime (Bernstein and 
Cashore 2007).  However, in most writings in law, political science and political theory, legitimacy 
has narrower connotations, and is associated with a normative acceptance (eg Hurd 1999), perhaps 
even a cognitive acceptance, of the right to govern.  It is this sense in which it is used here.      
One of the implications of being accepted as having a right to govern is that it is accepted that actor 
is afforded authority: to provide content-independent reasons for action.   Legitimacy and authority 
are thus fundamentally interlinked.  Moreover, drawing on sociological institutionalism, authority 
and legitimacy are relational, situational and endogenously produced.  As such the legitimacy of any 
one actor can differ significantly across time and space, and between actors, systems and contexts 
(Suchman 1995; Zucker 1987).  If we are trying to establish the legitimacy of an actor or system in 
practice, the relevant criteria are not those which an external observer (including a commentating 
academic) would see to be normatively valid or valuable.  Rather, the relevant criteria are those 
being used by those who are interacting with the actor in order for them to accept its right to 
govern, and thereby its authority.   Legitimacy lies in the eye of the beholder, in the values, interests 
and expectations and cognitive frames of the different ‘legitimacy communities’ who are perceiving 
or accepting the regulatory actor, system or regime.  Regulators, of any type, are thus likely to be 
subject to multiple legitimacy claims (demands) which differ between themselves quite 
substantially, and which indeed may be irreconcileable (Black 2008).    
How does this excursus into relational legitimacy relate to liquid authority?  Quite simply because 
authority is rooted in legitimacy.  Legitimacy in a regulatory and governance context means an 
acceptance of having the right to govern both by those it seeks to govern and those on behalf it 
purports to govern, and thus to exercise authority.   This applies equally to state based and non-state 
based regulatory regimes.  However, as the literature on transnational regulation, and the notion of 
liquid authority, makes clear, transnational regulators face a particular challenge for they rely on 
direct social acceptance for their legitimacy rather than on the mediating institutions of state-based 
constitutional settlements (Black 2009).  Each institution therefore needs to create its own 
legitimacy, constantly, in a never ending process of legitimation, and moreover, they need to do so 
in order to function.  But as legitimacy means acceptance of the right to govern, it is fundamentally 
rooted in social relations.   Where these social relations have not been formalised into a legally 
binding constitutional settlement (or where there is such a settlement but it is not regarded as 
legitimate), then the relational base for legitimacy, and in turn authority, needs constantly to be 
maintained and renewed.  The difficulty of the task is amplified in a context where the criteria for 
acceptance (legitimacy demands) are competing and changing, and  / or the differential power 
relations of the various groups making those demands are constantly shifting.   Moreover, 
transnational regulators are often caught in a legitimacy paradox - they need legitimacy (in part) to 
function effectively and need to function effectively (in part) to gain legitimacy. Understanding the 
fundamental dependence of liquid authority on a constantly shifting base of social acceptance 
(legitimacy), focuses attention on how regulatory actors will actively seek to gain legitimacy and 
thereby authority in a context where this is not conferred on them by an (accepted) constitutional 
settlement.  In both state and non-state contexts, regulators, like states or indeed any organisation, 
can manage their legitimacy, and thus authority, in a host of ways (Meyer and Rowan 1984; 
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Suchman 1995; Cashore 2002; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Black 2008 & 2009). Ole Jacob Sending’s 
paper in this symposium calls for attention to these processes of creation as regards the recognition 
that underlies authority. Understanding the dynamics of legitimation is critical to understanding the 
dynamics, or physiology, and not just the anatomy of authority in any context.  However, the need 
to understand the dynamics of legitimation has a particular functional urgency in the context of 
liquid authority as legitimacy cannot be assumed, and without legitimacy the regulatory regime 
cannot function.  Moreover, as noted above, regulators, particularly transnational regulators are 
often competing for ‘regulatory share’, which in turn depends on who accepts their right to govern.   
But  whilst regulatory actors can compete for legitimacy, whether they are accepted, and by whom, 
depends on whether their legitimacy communities will endow them with the legitimacy and 
authority they seek  (Black 2009). 
Examining the exercise of interpretive authority in three transnational regulatory regimes  
So, starting with the notion of liquid authority, we have now discussed how authority and legitimacy 
are inextricably linked, and how legitimacy is rooted in social relations.  This is so in any context. 
However, in a ‘liquid’ context, characterised by the absence of an accepted constitutional 
settlement, authority and legitimacy can be contested and the social relations on which they are 
based can be constantly shifting.  Now we need to loop back to the issue of interpretation and the 
exercise of interpretive control, and explore whether and how, in a ‘liquid’ context, an organisation 
(or individual) seeks to exercise interpretive control within a regulatory regime. 
As noted above, in any regulatory regime there is a  a prima facie functional reason to have a clearly 
identified component which exercises ultimate  interpretive control, which is to ensure the coherent 
and consistent operation of the regime.  In order for that control to be recognised as authoritative, 
ie for people to consider the utterances of that component of the regime as independent reasons for 
action, it has to be legitimate.  In a ‘liquid’ context, that authority and legitimacy has to be constantly 
built and renewed.   So there is a  continually shifting, iterative dynamic between the functional 
performance of one element of a regulatory regime (interpretation) and the attempts by the regime 
to to  establish and stabilise its authority and legitimacy in a changing context.  So in this endlessly 
changing context, do regulatory regimes (and particular components within them) seek to exercise 
interpretive control, and if so, how? This is a deliberately ‘sharp’ question to pose in what is an 
apparently endlessly fluid set of regulatory processes where, as Nico Krisch argues in the 
introduction, Westphalian state-based notions of authority or legitimacy seem out of place.   It is 
also an empirical question.   In exploring that question the article adopts an inductive approach, 
analysing three contrasting case studies in order to explore the relationship of liquid authority and 
legitimacy in the performance of the same function, interpretation.    
These regulatory regimes are deliberately selected as they exhibit differences in two pertinent 
characteristics: their institutional position within the transnational context in which they operate 
and the types of rules that they issue (on case study selection see Seawright and Gerring 2008; 
Gerring 2007).  Their institutional position is defined here in terms of the degree to which they are 
‘monopoly’ rule providers or are competing with other regulators over the same domain or issue-
area (see Butte and Mattli 2011),  and the degree to which their authority and legitimacy is 
contested.  The types of rules they use are relevant to the regulatory function under consideration, 
that of interpretation.  As discussed above, rules are an important technology of regulation, and rule 
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type can be a deliberate policy choice, not least because it can affect the mode of their 
interpretation and operation (Black 1998).   
IASB 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is the standard setting board of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation.  It is a non-state body, founded in 
1973 by a group of auditors and professional bodies (Camfferman and Zeff 2007).2  Initially its focus 
was on developing common ideas and objectives for financial reporting standards (Camfferman and 
Zeff 2007; Bhimani 2008). By the end of the 1990s it was being urged by professional bodies in some 
of the countries with significant financial centres, such as the UK, and by the global committee of 
securities regulators to become more proactive in harmonising standards around the world (Buthe 
and Mattli 2011).  The IASC responded by producing the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) and in a deliberate legitimation move, deliberately restructured its organisation and 
governance on the lines of the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (Bhimani 2008).  Since 2001, 
almost 120 countries have required or permitted the use of its rules. The main outlier has been the 
US, though work has been underway for some time to gain substantive convergence between the US 
GAAP and the IFRS standards.    
Despite its global significance, the IASB is still an associational body which lacks any political or state 
foundations.  It is dependent on governments to recognise its rules as legally valid, and thus the 
IASB’s authority to be the global accounting regulator.  As such it has to continually assert and 
maintain its legitimacy and authority.  To those ends, not only has it emphasised its technical 
expertise but it has relied increasingly on procedural transparency and on its governance structure 
to build its legitimacy and thus authority with those who rely on the regime and recognise its 
authority but are not direct participants in it.     
The key objective of the IASB is to develop common accounting rules with the ultimate goal of 
ensuring that the accounts of any listed company in any jurisdiction are comparable. The IASB 
therefore has a clear institutional interest in exercising interpretive control  to protect the integrity 
of its system of accounting standards: the goal of comparability will not be attained if its standards 
are being interpreted and applied very differently around the world.   
As noted above, rule design is one strategy that rule-writers can use to try to control interpretation.  
The IFRS are principle-based standards, which by their nature allow for greater interpretive choice 
by those implementing them.   The key method that the IASB uses to exercise interpretive authority 
and control is therefore not through rule type, but through a largely reactive process of giving rulings 
on the correct interpretations of its standards.  The interpretations process is highly structured and 
deliberately restricted – the IASB is concerned that over-use of its interpretations process would 
undermine the principles-based nature of its regulatory system and result in it developing into a 
rules-based regulator ‘through the back door’ (Alali and Cao 2010).   In 2002 it created an 
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the U.S. in 1975 Belgium, India, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan and Zimbabwe joined as associate members and 
in 1981, the World Bank, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), amongst others, formed its consultative group.  IOSCO joined the group in 1987; and the EU 
Commission and the US FASB joined as observers in 1990.   
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interpretations committee, now known as the IFRS Interpretations Committee (IFRS IC) to interpret 
the application of its accounting and reporting standards and provide ‘timely guidance’ on financial 
reporting issues.  In providing interpretations the Committee is to have regard to the need to 
develop international convergence.3   It does not respond to requests for interpretations on 
individual cases; instead it will only respond to requests which meet certain criteria.  The 
Committee’s composition and procedures have become increasingly transparent as the IASB itself 
has successively changed its constitution and become more open in its procedures as part of a wider 
strategy of legitimation.    
Nonetheless, the IASB is still vulnerable despite, and indeed because of, its growing dominance.  As 
the influence of the IASB has grown, as its authority has stabilised, so have there been increasing 
legitimacy demands  on it to become more transparent and accountable.   Moreover, in the wake of 
the financial crisis, both the countries using its standards and the global committees for banking 
supervision have sought to exercise greater political control over the decisions of the IASB (G20 
2008) and the IASB has constantly had to fight for its institutional position by emphasising its 
functional, epistemic and performance legitimacy claims as an authoritative, independent, 
technocratic body (Bengtsson 2011, Bhimani 2008; Sacho and Oberholster 2008, Street 2008; Perry 
and Nölke, 2006; Nobes 2008; Burland and Colasse 2011).   
The IASB thus illustrates the constant need that transnational regulators have to reaffirm and 
reassert their authority and legitimacy in the face of contestation.  The IASB has a strong functional 
imperative to maintain interpretive control, which is to create comparability between corporate 
financial statements and thus the integrity of the accounting regime as a whole.  In turn, its 
legitimacy and authority are dependent on its ability to maintain that interpretive control.  In making 
its legitimacy claim, the IASB relies on its position as the author and issuer of the standards it is 
interpreting, the highly structured and consultative procedures for giving interpretations, the 
expertise and impartiality of the decision makers and on the consensus basis of its decision making, 
relying on constitutional, internally democratic and epistemic legitimacy claims to create and 
maintain its legitimacy and thus its authority in this liquid context (see Black 2008).  Furthermore, 
the ways in which it exercises the function of interpretive control and asserts its authority are both 
dependent on and contribute to its wider need for and strategies of legitimation, and thus the 
creation, maintenance and enhancement of its institutional position in a dynamic context in which it 
occupies a dominant position but in which its role is nonetheless contested. 
ISO 
ISO has a longer history than the IASB and its position as the dominant, global technical standard 
setter is largely uncontested. Although the dominance of its standards in individual countries varies 
(Büthe and Mattli 2011),  ISO standards are on the whole widely adopted and referenced by 
international organisations, regional bodies such as the EU and national governments in their own 
legislation and other legal provisions (ISO 2007).  From the size of paper to the size of freight 
containers, it sets technical standards for thousands of products.  In its 9000 and 14000 series it also 
                                                          
3
 The procedures are set out at http://www.ifrs.org/How-we-develop-Interpretations/Pages/How-do-we-
maintain-IFRS.aspx. Note that procedures relating to all regulators analysed here are accurate as in December 
2015. 
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sets standards for quality management processes and practices.  The vast majority of its standards 
are certifiable, including the ISO 9000 and 14000 series, although it has also recently developed two 
further sets of standards which are not certifiable: on risk management (ISO 31000, in 2009) and 
social responsibility (ISO 26000, in 2010).    
However, for the most part, ISO does not seek to exert interpretive control directly over any of its 
standards or become involved in the certification process in any way, nor does it become involved in 
disputes between firms and certifiers as to whether or not certification should have been given.   
Instead, ISO uses the dual structure of accreditation and certification to ensure ‘correct’ 
implementation of its standards, operating through a ‘house like Jack built’ system of conformity 
assessment: firms are certified by an accredited certifier; the certifier is accredited by an accreditor, 
and accreditors are accredited by ISO (ISO, undated).   ISO focuses its attention instead on 
accreditation of the accreditors, which is ensured through a system of ISO inspections, sampling, 
supplier certification, and through peer assessment (for which there is also a standard: ISO/IEC 
17040:2005.) 
Rule type plays a key role in this strategy.  The significant majority of ISO’s standards are product 
standards which are highly specific and require little interpretation in their application.   ISO can 
therefore have reasonable confidence that multiple interpretations will not arise in the certification 
process so there is only a low risk that variation in certification practices will undermine the integrity 
of the ISO system.   For this reason, the ISO 31000 and ISO 26000 series are deliberately not 
certifiable as the standards are more open, and thus susceptible to a significant variation in 
implementation.  By rendering them non-certifiable, ISO can tolerate variation in interpretation as it 
will not  impact on the integrity of the certification system more widely.   
There are two notable exceptions where ISO issues interpretations: the ISO 9000 series, which apply 
to management systems generally and the ISO 17000 series, which apply to ISO accreditation bodies. 
The main reason for ISO’s selective exercise of interpretive authority lies in the potential for 
variation in application of these standards to undermine trust in the certification process, thus 
damaging both the functionality and the legitimacy of the ISO system as a whole.   
The ISO 9000 standards are written in quite general terms, which means that there is scope for 
interpretation and thus variation. This can pose problems of inconsistency, and in 2004 ISO agreed 
to provide interpretations for the ISO 9001:2000 standard in response to members’ demands in 
order to prevent ‘ambiguous and vague’ interpretations being given by certification bodies, and to 
develop a database of interpretations (ISO 2004).   Member bodies or liaison organisations can send 
requests for interpretation to the ISO Technical Committee 176, which is the ‘owner’ of the 
standards within ISO (ISO 2008). Interpretations then fed into a revised version of the ISO 9001:2000 
standard in 2008, which drew on members’ feedback and extensive user surveys (ISO 2008). The 
standard was due to be revised further by the end of 2015. 
The same reason, to maintain the integrity and thus legitimacy of the ISO system as a whole, 
motivates ISO’s exercise of interpretive control and authority over the ISO 17000 standards.   The 
ISO system relies critically on a widespread acceptance not only of the standards but of the 
worldwide certification processes, and is undermined if the widespread view is that certifiers in 
country X, for example, are corrupt, incompetent or simply feeble.  There is an underlying ‘stick’ at 
work too: ISO standards are approved under the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement 
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as not creating unnecessary barriers to trade.  ISO, and as ISO stresses, ISO members, therefore have 
a strong interest in ensuring that inadequate or corrupt conformity assessment procedures do not 
undermine this position (ISO undated).  Accreditors are important actors in this assurance process 
for ISO relies on them to act as guardians of the certification process, and to ensure mutual trust and 
recognition between certification bodies around the world. 
The critical part of ISO’s institutional infrastructure for interpretation of the ISO 17000 accreditation 
standards and maintenance of the accreditation system is the ISO Conformity Assessment 
Committee (CASCO).  CASCO’s role is to develop policy and publish standards related to conformity 
assessment, and it aims to promote the international harmonization of conformity assessment 
activities.  Through consensus-driven procedures (all decisions have to be approved by two-thirds of 
members) it provides non-binding interpretations (which since 2013 have been termed 
‘clarifications’) of the ISO 17000 standards for assessing the conformity of products, processes or 
management systems to ISO standards, thereby facilitating consistent interpretations and practices, 
and through that the mutual recognition of conformity assessment results.   The consensus 
procedures are intended to ensure that the interpretation is de facto accepted and adopted by 
members of the ISO community, but the clarification does not become binding until formally 
adopted and incorporated into a standard.4   
Thus for the most part, ISO is highly strategic in its use of its authority to exercise interpretive 
control, targeting it at what it considers to be the most critical point of intervention in the ISO 
regime in order to preserve its integrity, namely the accreditation process.  Its role in interpreting 
ISO 9000 standards has a slightly different rationale, is based instead on a response to a demand 
from members arising in part from the more open-ended structure of the ISO 9000 standards.   
However, in both instances the exercise of interpretive control is intimately linked to the need to 
preserve the integrity and therefore legitimacy and authority of the system as a whole. 
Forest Stewardship Council  
Established in 1993, the FSC aims to ensure that forests are managed in a manner which is 
environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable (FSC 2012).  Although 
probably the leading non-state transnational standard setters for sustainable forestry, the FSC 
competes with other transnational standard setters in  setting sustainable forest standards (Marx 
and Cuypers 2010, FSC 2011)5 and with national and regional governmental provisions on forestry 
and logging (Gulbrandsen 2004, Haufler, 2003).  However in an example of regulatory hybridisation,  
its standards have been incorporated into the regulation of national forests in some countries, for 
example the UK.   
                                                          
4
 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/conformity-assessment/conformity-assessment_resources.htm 
(accessed 4th January 2016). 
5
 Its principal competitor is PEFC (Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification), established in 1993 as 
Forest Europe and adopted by the UN Food and Agricultural Committee.  It claims to certify over two-thirds of 
the world’s forests (http://www.pefc.co.uk), whereas the FSC certifies about twenty per cent worldwide; 
however the overall figures mask considerable differences in distribution: the FSC certifies over 40% of 
certified forests in the US and Europe, but only 6% in S America; 5% in Africa, 3% in Asia and 1.5% in Oceania: 
FSC 2011.   
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The FSC system comprises four elements: regulative rules setting out principles of sustainable 
forestry management, a system of certification of compliance, chain of custody certification, and 
labelling.    Certification is performed by accredited certification bodies, who are accredited by the 
FSC’s own central accreditation body, Accreditation Services International (ASI).  Certified products 
are allowed to use the trademarked FSC label.  The FSC relies principally on market forces to 
generate uptake of its certification scheme, and most forests that are covered by FSC certification 
are either in developed countries and / or are those with export markets to those countries 
(Cashore, 2002; Cashore, Auld and Newsom, 2004; Pattberg 2005; Marx and Cuypers 2010).   
The multiple sites in which its standards are being implemented necessarily poses challenges for the 
FSC in ensuring consistency in their interpretation and application.  Consistency of interpretation is 
linked fundamentally to the integrity of the FSC label, and in turn the legitimacy and thus survival of 
the regime.  This is particularly relevant for, as noted, the FSC is operating in a context in which it is 
competing for ‘regulatory share’ with a number of other national and transnational organisations.   
One of its key claims to legitimacy is that it is a rigorous standard which is superior to its 
competitors, and one with which compliance is ensured through a robust certification process (FSC 
undated, Kooster 2010).   
The FSC operates a complex federal structure and has an elaborate system of rules constituting and 
regulating its own governance which has developed and intensified over time, partly in response to 
internal demands and partly to external pressures.  The standards making process is carefully 
designed to demonstrate compliance with the applicable requirements of the ISO Code of Good 
Practice for Standardisation (ISO 1994), and the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement 
(WTO 1994).   
All FSC standards, including its core Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship are developed by 
the Policy and Standards Unit in the FSC International Centre and approved by the FSC Board.   
Central to the FSC governance model is multi-stakeholder decision making (Auld and Bull 2003), and 
Principles and Criteria are closely fought over internally.  Guidance documents are developed in 
response to questions submitted to FSC by other FSC Units and/or by certification bodies or FSC 
National Initiatives.  Interpretations on FSC standards are given centrally by the Policy and Standards 
Unit, which may decide to develop a guidance document or an Advice Note in response to enquiries 
from FSC members, certification bodies and / or FSC national initiatives.  
The FSC has also adopted a deliberate policy of rule design as a regulatory technique to manage rule 
interpretations given the challenges of scale and variety it faces, and its need to manage the 
competing demands of consistency and the need for application and interpretation to respond to 
local contexts.  It has a four tier rule structure comprising: principles, which define the overall goal; 
criteria, which set out ‘how to comply’ or the means of judging whether or not there has been 
compliance; indicators, which are measurable states which are used to assess whether the principle 
or criterion is being complied with, and verifiers, which set out the means to ensure that the 
indicator is being realised.  The composite is referred to as an FSC standard.  The structure of the 
standards closely imitates the engineering-type standards of ISO in order to try to leave as little 
interpretive discretion as possible.  Evaluative words such as ‘appropriate’ are banned in an 
organisational exercise in self-censorship.   The aim is to produce standards which can be audited in 
a consistent manner, providing replicable results across all locations (FSC 2009).  
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However, the FSC allows local adaptation through the adoption of different indicators and verifiers 
at the regional, national or sub-national level.  It is has also spent several years developing generic 
indicators to accompany its Principles and Criteria to give greater guidance to those at the local level 
(FSC 2010).6   Stakeholder engagement is also required in the elaboration of local indicators.   
However, as noted above, no standard is ever completely unambiguous.  Rules and standards always 
and everywhere have to be translated: interpreted and applied to particular states of affairs.  
Differences are bound to arise, therefore, in the way that different certification bodies (or different 
individuals within them) interpret and apply those standards (Counsell and Loraas 2002; (Maletz and 
Tysiachniouk 2009; Eden 2008). 
As the FSC system has grown, its processes for ensuring control over the interpretation of the 
Principles and Criteria and the development of local indicators have increased in density over time.  
They have also become centralised within the organisational structure.  In the FSC’s early days, ASI 
had responsibility to monitor local adaptations.  In the early days of the FSC, its certification process 
was strongly criticised as ineffective in a high-profile study by an influential NGO (Counsell and 
Loraas 2002).  Although the criticism was countered by the FSC (FSC 2003) it recognised that the 
rapid uptake of FSC principles had outstripped the development of an infrastructure to support the 
certification process, either through training or through the consistent provision of interpretations 
and guidance (FSC 2006).   It thus began to increase its attempts to control the certification process, 
including a requirement on ASI to gain ISO accreditation (ASI 2008).  In 2008 the interpretative 
function was centralised, and the FSC Policy and Standards Unit was placed in the centre of the local 
standards development process.   There is now a clear hierarchical framework, at least formally, 
under which local standard bodies develop local indicators in accordance FSC required procedures, 
which include a requirement for piloting those indicators, ‘forest testing’, and those standards are 
then approved by the FSC Policy and Standards Unit.7   Nonetheless, the FSC remains critically 
dependent on the regulatory capacity of organisations at the national level to draft standards, to 
establish and then consult with the local groups as demanded by the FSC process requirements, and 
indeed to stimulate local demand for FSC certification at all. 
Despite the very different institutional structure and operational context of the FSC regime, there 
are a number of parallels with the IASB and ISO in the way in which the FSC seeks to exercise 
interpretive control.   There is a highly structured process for applying for and issuing 
interpretations, only a limited range of people or organisations can request interpretations (more 
restricted than the IASB), and interpretations are based strongly in consensus.  In exercising its 
interpretive authority the FSC emphasises its role as the guardian of the FSC standards and its 
independent expertise, and thus epistemic authority, in issuing interpretations.   Again, interpretive 
control  is seen as critical to maintaining the integrity and thus legitimacy of the regime as a whole, 
but the FSC faces much greater competition in maintaining or enhancing its regulatory share (by 
getting organisations to accept its standards) than either ISO or IASB, making it more vulnerable to 
weaknesses in the certification process.  It therefore seeks to manage its competing logics (Baldwin 
                                                          
6
 The process ran from 2006-2009, during which time the FSC reviewed over 10,000 indicators, including those 
used in regional / local Forest Stewardship Standards and ultimately identified 345 ‘best bet’ generic indicators 
to be used, though note that these are being revised in line with revisions to the Principles and Criteria.  
7
 FSC, Structure and Content of National Forest Stewardship Standards FSC-STD-60-002 (FSC, 2009); FSC, 
Process Requirements for the Development and Maintenance of Forest Stewardship Standards (FSC, 2009). 
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and Black 2005; Auld, Rencken and Cashore 2015) of consistency and control, with a commitment to 
local empowerment in a federated structure.  However there is an inevitable, and potentially 
irreconcileable tension between local empowerment and the exercise of central control, not only 
because of their competing logics but because the exercise of each is critical to the FSC’s 
legitimation, but for different reasons.   Local empowerment is  central to the FSC’s internal 
legitimation by its members, but the functional problems of scale and variety in the sites of 
interpretation requires the FSC to exert central control throughout the interpretive chain in order to 
maintain the integrity, reputation and thus legitimacy and authority of the FSC regime as a whole 
Observations and conclusions:  ‘liquid’ authority, rules, and the exercise of interpretive control 
This article has focused on a little explored aspect of transnational regulatory governance regimes, 
which is how they exercise the function of interpretive control over the norms they issue.  
Interpretation is a core element of the use of rules as a regulatory technology, and thus a critical 
element to the functioning of a regulatory regime.  However, it has argued that in order to exercise 
this critical function of interpretive control in a context in which its authority is ‘liquid’, a regulatory 
regime has to build its legitimacy.   In so doing, it is seeking to ‘solidify’ or crystallise its authority in a 
particular way at a particular time, but in contexts in which authority may be more or less fluid, 
legitimacy more or less contested, and thus the task of crystallisation correspondingly easier or more 
complex.    
As discussed above, the notion of liquid authority retains the core concept of authority as a content-
independent reason for action, but the ‘anatomical’ analysis offered by Krisch (this volume) focuses 
attention on structures: how authority is constituted, how it is exercised, and the degree to which it 
is contested in transnational contexts. In focusing on a particular function which is common to state-
based and transnational regulators, the interpretation of rules, the article draws attention to the 
different operational dynamics of transnational regulatory regimes, as opposed to those operating 
within the context of an accepted constitutional settlement and legal order (note that there can be 
non-state based regimes which are regarded by some as more legitimate than the state-based 
regimes, but that is not the focus of this paper).   Regulatory regimes which operate on the basis of 
‘liquid’ authority constantly need  to earn their authority through establishing their legitimacy, 
rather than being able to rely on the mediating institutions of state constitutions to give them their 
right to govern.  The three case studies illustrate how, in different ways and to different degrees, 
transnational reguIators are vulnerable to shifts in their acceptance from often changing 
constellations of actors on whom they are relying for their legitimacy, their authority, and, in turn, 
their ability to function, and how this affects their exercise of interpretive control.    
Each of the regimes considered here seek to exercise differing degrees of interpretive control over 
their standards, and have very different techniques and institutional arrangements for doing so.    
These arrangements have evolved over time in response to both the functional need to ensure 
consistency of interpretations in order to attain the overall goals of the regime, such as 
comparability and inter-operability in the case of ISO and IASB, and / or to ensure the integrity of the 
system as a whole, as in the case of the certification and labelling regimes of ISO and FSC.  Their 
strategies for exercising interpretive control are similar in some regards, but differ in others.   In 
their similarities, each has clearly structured sets of procedures for providing interpretations, and 
interpretations are based on consensus.  Procedures for requesting interpretations are also clearly 
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prescribed.  Each seeks to legitimate its authority as interpreter through its position as author of the 
standards, its epistemic authority, ie its independent expertise, and the consensus based nature of 
its interpretation process.  ISO is distinct from IASB and FSC in that, for the most part, ISO is a 
standard setter that does not seek to exert interpretive authority directly over the vast majority of 
its standards as they are implemented by firms or others.  Scale alone would make this almost 
impossible, given the high number of ISO standards in existence.  Instead, it is highly strategic in its 
use of its interpretive authority, targeting it at what it considers to be the most critical point of 
intervention in the ISO regime in order to preserve its integrity, namely the accreditation process.   
The FSC also has issues of scale to deal with, but it has the additional challenge of facing much 
greater competition from other regulators in maintaining or enhancing its regulatory share than 
either ISO or IASB, making it more vulnerable to weaknesses in the certification process.  In addition, 
it has to manage the competing logics of interpretive consistency and control with a commitment to 
local empowerment in a federated structure, which it does in part through a system of differentiated 
rule types.   
 
It is always dangerous to generalise from case studies but some preliminary observations can be 
made.   First, there is a complex interdependency between legitimacy of the regime as a whole and 
its functional effectiveness.   The function of providing interpretations of rules that apply across the 
regime is at once an exercise of authority which relies on legitimacy, and is used to constitute that 
legitimacy by preserving the integrity of the regime through establishing consistency of meaning and 
application of the rules.   Moreover, the manner in which interpretive control is exercised is used to 
bolster legitimacy claims rooted in constitutionality, internally participative democracy, and 
expertise and technocratic functionality.  In turn, that legitimacy grounds the authority of the regime 
in the absence of the state.  However, liquidity is a differentiated state: some regimes are operating 
in contexts in which they are more accepted than others, associated in part to the length of time in 
which they have been in existence and the extent to which their position is contested.  ISO is the 
longest established of the three and is widely accepted as a global technical standard setter, 
enjoying a quasi-monopoly position in many areas in which it operates as well as the acceptance of 
many countries’ governments.  The IASB also has widespread acceptance and now faces only one 
major competitor - the US - but it had to fight for its institutional position as it grew and in the face 
of challenges in the immediate wake of the financial crisis.  The FSC, in contrast, operates in a 
context in which it has to compete constantly for regulatory share and is in a continual process of 
renewing and maintaining its legitimacy and authority in the face of competing legitimacy demands.   
Thus the authority of each varies in the degree of its ‘liquidity’ in practice.  This in turn seems to have 
some relation to whether and how they seek to exercise interpretive control over their norms.  It is 
possible to hypothesise, at least, that there is a relationship between the two. 
Second, the analysis illustrates the dynamics of a small but significant part of the dense network of 
regulatory conversations through which such regimes are continually reproduced.  It shows that the 
functional need for a centralised exercise of interpretive control is met by all regimes, but is put 
under constant pressure as the regimes develop over time.  The regimes considered here have 
responded to the pressures of changes in scale, scope and operational contexts by increasing the 
density of their institutional structures, introducing central organisational bodies and increasingly 
formalised processes for providing interpretations.  It is notable that rule type is not consistently 
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used as a device to promote consistency of interpretations, and thus to limit the need for the 
exercise of interpretive control.  Moreover, Issuing interpretations is a highly strategic function in 
each case, performed by a a central component of the regime  acting in accordance with  quite 
formalised procedures which restrict access to those seeking interpretations, and which can become 
increasingly dense as the functional demands for interpretive consistency increase.  As we have seen 
with ISO, ultimately the demands of scale are such that rule makers strategically target the exercise 
of the interpretive function to points which they consider most critical to the effective operation of 
the regime as a whole.     
Third, as the regimes or systems grow in scale and scope, and as their institutional position becomes 
more dominant, greater demands on their legitimacy are made by more legitimacy communities in 
proportion to the regime’s  growing influence and claims to authority, to which they have to 
respond.  However, the maintenance of legitimacy and authority is a particular challenge where 
legitimacy demands compete.  For example, the ‘logic’ of the regime (and on which it may also base 
its legitimacy) may be one which encourages widespread ownership of the rules through a federated 
structure, such as the FSC, and in which central control over interpretations may be resisted 
internally by members.  However these internal legitimation demands contrast with those being 
made by external legitimacy communities, who see consistency as central to the system’s functional 
integrity and thus legitimacy and authority.  This contestation renders the exercise of interpretive 
control more complex in a context where authority is relatively liquid, as the functional need for 
interpretive control can be in tension with the need to respect the role of others to issue their own, 
localised interpretations. These competing demands between central control and local autonomy 
are common in any federated structure, but for those operating in a ‘liquid’ context, there is no 
recognised arbiter to resolve them in the form of a constitutional agreement enforced by a court.  
Instead they have to be resolved by the regime itself, and how it does so will in turn affect the 
legitimacy it receives from different legitimacy communities, and ultimately its ability to function.   
So the notion of ‘liquidity’ draws attention to the fluidity of the legitimacy context in which 
transnational regulators can operate, and in turn their authority.  However, as this analysis suggests, 
some contexts can be more fluid than others.  Regulators operating in such contexts can adopt 
various strategies to ‘solidify’ their position by gaining legitimacy from different legitimacy 
communities.  Legitimacy in turn affects their ability to exercise authority, and their ability to 
function.  The article has focused only on one regulatory function, that of interpretation.  The 
analysis suggests that the exercise of interpretive  control is intimately linked to the regulator’s 
efforts to create, develop maintain and even repair its legitimacy in a context where that legitimacy 
and associated authority is endogenous, relational and contested: it is ‘liquid’.   In so doing, it 
illustrates how regulatory actors can develop their institutional structures and processes and deploy 
different legitimation strategies as they seek to maintain their institutional position over time.It 
highlights the fluid and dynamic nature of regulatory regimes, the developing ‘crystallisation’ of 
institutional structures and processes as a regime seeks to meet the challenges of its expanding scale 
and scope, and the internal and external functional and legitimation pressures it faces.  Such an 
exploration also enables us to identify points of concentration and fragmentation within regimes 
based in liquid authority, and to see where and how authority may be ‘solidified’. It thus enables us 
to see where and how legitimacy and authority may crystallise, but to recognise that whilst 
hardened they may remain brittle and vulnerable to challenge.   
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